The main task of this paper is grounding the socio-anthropological “naturalization”of meaning operated by the later Wittgenstein in his remarks on rule-followingin the Philosophical Investigations in considerations relating to models oflow-level (biological) processes of imitation, training, and learning. If the operationsuggested above is successful, two of its immediate consequences are that the socialaspect of language can no longer be considered as a primitive notion, but needsto be placed upon, if not reduced to, a biological foundation; and that the studyof thought, and, actually, of certain brain processes, becomes prior in the order ofexplanation to the study of language. The issues raised in this article are relevantto Wittgenstein scholarship, to any attempt to produce an acceptable philosophy oflanguage, and to all those interested in the tenability of one of the cornerstones ofanalytic philosophy, the so-called “priority thesis”: the study of language is prior, inthe order of explanation, to the study of thought.
|Numero di pagine||21|
|Rivista||GIORNALE DI METAFISICA|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2018|