The topic of the essay is the relationship between time and pure practical reason in the Kant’s Theory of the free determination of the will. We ask if the orientation of the free will to the moral law implies a specific orientation in time, in which the subject can get the sense of the absolute and urgent rational obbligation to the freedom. We analyse the dinamical aspect of the pure reason on the intermediete normative level of the maxims. We research in which kind of reference points in time are the conditions of possibility of the subversion of the empirical causality, of the turn of the subjective principles’ order, of the Revolution in Conduct of Thought. Furthermore temporal references are required in order to understand thr historical continuity in which evolves the intelligible character, the qualitative modifications of the self as a moral improvement and the infinite duration of the Personality.
|Numero di pagine||100|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2013|