The paper discusses the concept of the life-world presented by Husserl in thelate 30ies. The first step explores the specific meaning of the idea of a constitution when applied to the life-world. The constitution of the life-world refers to a specific kind ofintentionality, which implies the interconnection of plural individual intentionalities(Vergemeinschaftung). The characteristic totality of the world, however, requiresa second step: the individuation of a specific practical and theoretical attitude(Einstellung) that Husserl refers to, in a late manuscript, with the term “Angehen”(concern). My claim is that only a practical and ethical approach can actually makesense of the world as a life-world. Since such a claim does only find a limited developmentin Husserl’s work, I turn to Waldenfel’s idea of responsivity and Patocka’sfurther elaboration of the phenomenological ideas of subjectivity and life-world aspresented in his Habilitationsschrift and in the late manuscripts on Erscheinen.
|Numero di pagine||18|
|Rivista||GIORNALE DI METAFISICA|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2018|