Standard accounts of social reality take collective intentionality as the starting point of the creation and maintenance of social facts. But collective intentionality is enabled, as Searle suggests, by a more basic capacity to understand another person as an agent like oneself and as ready to engage in cooperative activities. We can coordinate our collective actions only insofar we are able to explain and predict the behavior of other persons, we can understand behavior only insofar we can mindread them, and we can mindread them only if we assume the constitutive role of rationality in action. Therefore collective intentionality requires mindreading, and mindreading requires that we assume the rationality of the agent. Contemporary debate on mindreading, however, excludes rationality as a viable option to account for mindreading. Does this point undermine our account of collective intentionality? We argue that, mostly when we fail in mindreading tasks, we make a rational effort of adjusting our misinterpretation. This entails balancing two factors: a) general theoretical information about the target and simulative strategies; b) normative considerations. Therefore we propose that rationality theory and hybrid theory of mindreading are not incompatible but should fruitfully interact. Moreover, the rational effort should also entail an attitude to individualize our prediction/explanation by means of more and accurate information about the specific target we are mindreading. This kind of information is not only theoretical, representational and propositional but also practical, based on our local (cultural) and deep (biological) Background knowledge that we have as embodied, embedded agents.
|Numero di pagine||1|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2013|