Abstract
Standard
accounts
of
social
reality
take
collective
intentionality
as
the starting
point
of
the
creation
and
maintenance
of
social
facts.
But
collective intentionality
is
enabled,
as
Searle
suggests,
by
a
more
basic
capacity
to
understand
another
person
as
an
agent
like
oneself
and
as
ready
to
engage
in
cooperative
activities.
We
can
coordinate
our
collective
actions
only
insofar
we
are
able
to
explain
and
predict
the
behavior
of
other
persons,
we
can
understand
behavior
only
insofar
we
can
mindread
them,
and
we
can
mindread
them
only
if
we
assume
the
constitutive
role
of
rationality
in
action.
Therefore
collective
intentionality
requires
mindreading,
and
mindreading
requires
that
we
assume
the
rationality
of
the
agent.
Contemporary
debate
on
mindreading, however,
excludes
rationality
as
a
viable
option
to
account
for mindreading.
Does
this
point
undermine
our
account
of collective
intentionality?
We
argue
that,
mostly
when
we
fail
in
mindreading
tasks,
we
make
a
rational
effort
of
adjusting
our misinterpretation.
This
entails
balancing
two
factors:
a)
general
theoretical
information
about
the
target
and
simulative
strategies;
b)
normative
considerations.
Therefore
we
propose
that
rationality
theory
and
hybrid
theory
of
mindreading
are
not
incompatible
but
should
fruitfully
interact.
Moreover,
the
rational
effort
should
also
entail
an
attitude
to
individualize
our
prediction/explanation
by
means
of
more
and
accurate
information
about
the
specific
target
we
are
mindreading.
This
kind
of
information
is
not
only
theoretical,
representational
and
propositional
but
also
practical,
based
on
our
local
(cultural)
and
deep
(biological)
Background
knowledge
that
we
have
as
embodied,
embedded
agents.
Lingua originale | English |
---|---|
Pagine | 48-48 |
Numero di pagine | 1 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Published - 2013 |