Robust dynamic cooperative games

Dario Bauso, Timmer

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21 Citazioni (Scopus)


Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. We consider a dynamic context where at each point in time the coalitional values are unknown but bounded by a polyhedron. However, the average value of each coalition in the long run is known with certainty. We design “robust” allocation rules for this context, which are allocation rules that keep the coalition excess bounded while guaranteeing each player a certain average allocation (over time). We also present a joint replenishment application to motivate our model.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Numero di pagine13
RivistaInternational Journal of Game Theory
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2009


All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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