Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games

Dario Bauso, James Fleming, Mark Cannon

Risultato della ricerca: Other

4 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls andadversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitionalgames with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions underwhich the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predened target set.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Numero di pagine6
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cita questo

Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games. / Bauso, Dario; Fleming, James; Cannon, Mark.

2014.

Risultato della ricerca: Other

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