Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis

Masserini, L; Pratesi, M

Risultato della ricerca: Chapter

Abstract

In this paper we perform a statistical evaluation of whether it is worthwhile, in economic terms, to resist to extortion demands by the ma a, from the point of view of rms operating in an area dominated by criminal organizations. We use a unique collected and matched database on rm characteristics on the city of Palermo, highly controlled by the ma a racket. The underlined idea is that the claimed resistance has (direct and indirect) costs and bene ts, so that a rational rm should take this decision according its economic expectations on the future pro ts (in addition to potential ethic considerations). It means that the economic policy messages of this experience can be linked to make more pro table the racket resistance (as a signal sent to the market). Our evidences based on multilevel discrete choice models show that this decision is strongly in uenced by socio-economic characteristics of the district, type of activity involved and other factors.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Titolo della pubblicazione ospiteLLEE Working Paper Series
Pagine-
Numero di pagine35
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2014

Serie di pubblicazioni

NomeLLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115

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Empirical analysis
Extortion
Economic policy
Factors
Indirect costs
Socioeconomic characteristics
Data base
Economics
Discrete choice
Evaluation
Evidence-based

Cita questo

Masserini, L; Pratesi, M (2014). Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis. In LLEE Working Paper Series (pagg. -). (LLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115).

Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis. / Masserini, L; Pratesi, M.

LLEE Working Paper Series. 2014. pag. - (LLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115).

Risultato della ricerca: Chapter

Masserini, L; Pratesi, M 2014, Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis. in LLEE Working Paper Series. LLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115, pagg. -.
Masserini, L; Pratesi, M. Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis. In LLEE Working Paper Series. 2014. pag. -. (LLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115).
Masserini, L; Pratesi, M. / Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis. LLEE Working Paper Series. 2014. pagg. - (LLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115).
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