Reputation Management in Distributed Systems

De Paola A; Tamburo A

Risultato della ricerca: Paper

8 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

Several distributed applications, implemented over today’s Internet, are based on the assumption that participating agents collaborate in order to achieve their own goal. However, when these applications are modelled as unstructured distributed systems, the greater autonomy and decentralization encourage antisocial behaviours, which are likely to cause performance degradation for the whole system. This paper presents a fully distributed reputation management system that allows the evaluation of agent reputation in unstructured environments without any centralized coordination. The proposed approach is based on game theory and is capable of capturing the highly dynamic nature of the involved communities. As a representative example of an unstructured environment, Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are considered. Those dynamic communities are affected by several antisocial behaviours, such as free riding. Since this phenomenon typically causes and exacerbates an unbalanced and unfair use of system resources, it has been considered as the case study in our work. The proposed solution exploits peer reputations in order to define an incentive system, whose main goal is the dissuasion from free riding.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2008

Fingerprint

Peer to peer networks
Game theory
Internet

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Signal Processing

Cita questo

De Paola A; Tamburo A (2008). Reputation Management in Distributed Systems.

Reputation Management in Distributed Systems. / De Paola A; Tamburo A.

2008.

Risultato della ricerca: Paper

De Paola A; Tamburo A 2008, 'Reputation Management in Distributed Systems'.
De Paola A; Tamburo A. Reputation Management in Distributed Systems. 2008.
@conference{377d24bee38044afbd0ea20a4caed045,
title = "Reputation Management in Distributed Systems",
abstract = "Several distributed applications, implemented over today’s Internet, are based on the assumption that participating agents collaborate in order to achieve their own goal. However, when these applications are modelled as unstructured distributed systems, the greater autonomy and decentralization encourage antisocial behaviours, which are likely to cause performance degradation for the whole system. This paper presents a fully distributed reputation management system that allows the evaluation of agent reputation in unstructured environments without any centralized coordination. The proposed approach is based on game theory and is capable of capturing the highly dynamic nature of the involved communities. As a representative example of an unstructured environment, Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are considered. Those dynamic communities are affected by several antisocial behaviours, such as free riding. Since this phenomenon typically causes and exacerbates an unbalanced and unfair use of system resources, it has been considered as the case study in our work. The proposed solution exploits peer reputations in order to define an incentive system, whose main goal is the dissuasion from free riding.",
author = "{De Paola A; Tamburo A} and {De Paola}, Alessandra",
year = "2008",
language = "English",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Reputation Management in Distributed Systems

AU - De Paola A; Tamburo A

AU - De Paola, Alessandra

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Several distributed applications, implemented over today’s Internet, are based on the assumption that participating agents collaborate in order to achieve their own goal. However, when these applications are modelled as unstructured distributed systems, the greater autonomy and decentralization encourage antisocial behaviours, which are likely to cause performance degradation for the whole system. This paper presents a fully distributed reputation management system that allows the evaluation of agent reputation in unstructured environments without any centralized coordination. The proposed approach is based on game theory and is capable of capturing the highly dynamic nature of the involved communities. As a representative example of an unstructured environment, Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are considered. Those dynamic communities are affected by several antisocial behaviours, such as free riding. Since this phenomenon typically causes and exacerbates an unbalanced and unfair use of system resources, it has been considered as the case study in our work. The proposed solution exploits peer reputations in order to define an incentive system, whose main goal is the dissuasion from free riding.

AB - Several distributed applications, implemented over today’s Internet, are based on the assumption that participating agents collaborate in order to achieve their own goal. However, when these applications are modelled as unstructured distributed systems, the greater autonomy and decentralization encourage antisocial behaviours, which are likely to cause performance degradation for the whole system. This paper presents a fully distributed reputation management system that allows the evaluation of agent reputation in unstructured environments without any centralized coordination. The proposed approach is based on game theory and is capable of capturing the highly dynamic nature of the involved communities. As a representative example of an unstructured environment, Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are considered. Those dynamic communities are affected by several antisocial behaviours, such as free riding. Since this phenomenon typically causes and exacerbates an unbalanced and unfair use of system resources, it has been considered as the case study in our work. The proposed solution exploits peer reputations in order to define an incentive system, whose main goal is the dissuasion from free riding.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/31482

UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4537308&queryText%3DReputation+Management+in+Distributed+Systems

M3 - Paper

ER -