In this paper we defend a psychological account of rule-based reasoning,specifically of the relationship between rules and exceptions. The topic of ourinquiry are the relations between rules, the reasons underlying them, and exceptions.In analysing these relations, first, we outline an apparent paradox, the“paradox of rules”, and a related problem, the “problem of reconsideration”.Then, we propose a solution to, or better dissolution of, the paradox, groundedin an account of the psychological processes underlying rule-application andreconsideration. We claim, that is, that the problem of reconsideration shouldbe answered by appealing to matters of sheer psychological fact. The upshot ofthis argument is a psychologistic conception of rules and of rule-based reasoning.We will explain what we mean by “psychologism” and why, to our minds, apsychologistic theory of rules and of rule-based reasoning is on the right track.
|Numero di pagine||14|
|Rivista||ANALISI E DIRITTO|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2018|