In this paper I try to revise Sen’s thesis about the “transcendental” nature of Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Sen transcendental theories of justice are unnecessary. What we aim at is to justify a series of comparative judgements about two or more states of affairs. We do not strive, unlike Rawls, to form a complete system of moral principles that backs an “ideal just society”. I try to show that Sen’s “comparative” account is weak. First of all, Sen does not offer a fair interpretation of Rawls’ theory. In particular, he is wrong when he depicts Rawls’ justice as fairness as a complete and transcendental moral doctrine. Secondly, Sen overlooks the fact that in order to justify comparative evaluations of states of affairs we must assume as valid a particular moral doctrine. Finally I try to solve the problem about the contrast between transcendental and comparative account by offering a transcendental outlook to questions of justice that is, at the same time, pluralist and incomplete.
|Numero di pagine||15|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2010|
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