Pre-conventions. A fragment of the Background

Bruno Celano, Bruno Celano

Risultato della ricerca: Article

11 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I argue that there exist conventions of a peculiar sort, which are neither norms nor regularities of behaviour, partaking of both. I proceed as follows. After a sketchy analysis of the meaning of ‘convention’, I give some examples of the kind of phenomena I have in mind: bodily skills, know-how, taste and style, habitus (P. Bourdieu), “disciplines” (M. Foucault). Then I group some arguments supporting my claim: (i) considerations about the identity conditions of precedents (D. Lewis) and about the projectibility of predicates in inductive inference generally (N. Goodman); (ii) thoughts about rule-following (L. Wittgenstein); (iii) an examination of some of J. R. Searle’s ideas about the “Background” of intentionality. I conclude with some remarks about the time-honoured antithesis ‘nature’ v. ‘convention’.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)9-32
Numero di pagine24
RivistaRevus
Volumen. 30
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2016

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Wittgenstein, L.
Foucault, M.
Bourdieu, P.
regularity
know how
examination
Group
time

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Law

Cita questo

Celano, B., & Celano, B. (2016). Pre-conventions. A fragment of the Background. Revus, n. 30, 9-32.

Pre-conventions. A fragment of the Background. / Celano, Bruno; Celano, Bruno.

In: Revus, Vol. n. 30, 2016, pag. 9-32.

Risultato della ricerca: Article

Celano, B & Celano, B 2016, 'Pre-conventions. A fragment of the Background', Revus, vol. n. 30, pagg. 9-32.
Celano, Bruno ; Celano, Bruno. / Pre-conventions. A fragment of the Background. In: Revus. 2016 ; Vol. n. 30. pagg. 9-32.
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