Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games

Dario Bauso; Dario Bauso; Giacomo Como; Fabio Bagagiolo

Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games

Dario Bauso, Dario Bauso, Giacomo Como, Fabio Bagagiolo

Ingegneria

Risultato della ricerca: Other › peer review

8 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness. The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The game takes on the form of two partial differential equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest, we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach epsilon-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent's opinion.

Lingua originale	English
Pagine	2519-2524
Numero di pagine	6
Stato di pubblicazione	Published - 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Control and Systems Engineering
Modelling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

Altri file e collegamenti

OA Link

Fingerprint Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo

@conference{03f1f6fd72c94736a62512c54e5bba9e,

title = "Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games",

abstract = "This paper provides a mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness. The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The game takes on the form of two partial differential equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest, we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach epsilon-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent's opinion.",

author = "Dario Bauso and Dario Bauso and Giacomo Como and Fabio Bagagiolo",

year = "2013",

language = "English",

pages = "2519--2524",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games

AU - Bauso, Dario

AU - Como, Giacomo

AU - Bagagiolo, Fabio

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - This paper provides a mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness. The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The game takes on the form of two partial differential equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest, we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach epsilon-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent's opinion.

AB - This paper provides a mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness. The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The game takes on the form of two partial differential equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest, we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach epsilon-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent's opinion.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/120200

M3 - Other

SP - 2519

EP - 2524

ER -