Opinion dynamics and stubbornness through mean-field games

Dario Bauso, Dario Bauso, Giacomo Como, Fabio Bagagiolo

Risultato della ricerca: Otherpeer review

8 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a mean field game theoretic interpretation of opinion dynamics and stubbornness. The model describes a crowd-seeking homogeneous population of agents, under the influence of one stubborn agent. The game takes on the form of two partial differential equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation for the individual optimal response and the population evolution, respectively. For the game of interest, we establish a mean field equilibrium where all agents reach epsilon-consensus in a neighborhood of the stubborn agent's opinion.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Pagine2519-2524
Numero di pagine6
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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