Norma de reconocimiento, convención y obligación. Aquello che Shapiro todavía puede aprender de los errores de Hart

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Shapiro works out a version of legal positivism taking asits starting point Hart’s practice theory of law. Some serious limits ofHart’s practice theory of norms concern the conception of legal obligationand normativity of law. In this paper I analyze the limits of Hart’sconception of legal normativity and I appraise whether the planningtheory of law indicates the correct direction for overcoming them. Toanticipate the conclusion, my effort is to show that Shapiro replicatesHart’s mistakes on this subject-matters. The paper is divided in threemain sections. First, I will present briefly a critical reconstruction ofHart’s conception of normativity, reconstruction which is partiallydifferent from that given by Shapiro in Legalida d. I will analyze eitherthe original conception of normativity sketched out by Hart in TheConcept of Law and the (partially) different conception which can bedrawn by the Postscript. Then, I will deepen the conceptions of legalobligation and authority of law associated with the planning theoryof law. Few concluding remarks will be devoted to some Shapiro’sassumptions on legal positivism.
Lingua originaleSpanish
pagine (da-a)135-177
Numero di pagine43
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2019

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