Abstract
The wide-body long-range aircrafts market is characterized by increasing rivalry between Airbus and Boeing. One of the factors that drive their strategic behaviour is technological. We propose a technology indicator to identify conditions under which the aircraft companies have incentives to join a coalition. For this, we provide measurement of the side-payments necessary to sign a strategic alliance aimed at reducing technological barriers in the market. The results suggest that the existence of side-payments guarantees the stability of a strategic alliance if the gap in the technological level between the firms is high, or competition is through prices. For monopoly, a strategic alliance is profitable, but never stable.
Lingua originale | English |
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pagine (da-a) | 139-148 |
Numero di pagine | 10 |
Rivista | Journal of Air Transport Management |
Volume | 13 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Published - 2007 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- ???subjectarea.asjc.3300.3313???
- ???subjectarea.asjc.1400.1408???
- ???subjectarea.asjc.2300.2308???
- ???subjectarea.asjc.3300.3308???