This paper aims at demonstrating that interpretation of boundary treaties shows interesting differences with the rules codified under articles 31-33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The paper argues that there are several problems which can be grouped around two main issues. The first issue concerns the legal effects of the clauses delimitating territories; the second issue relates to the content of these clauses. A) As regards their legal effects, boundary treaties have been interpreted according to the methodological directives of the Vienna Convention, but a considerable emphasis has been placed upon a substantive interpretative principle, which is commonly identified as the “stability (certainty, finality) of boundaries” principle. B) A different approach is adopted to the interpretation of the content of the delimitation clauses. On the one side, international arbitral tribunals and judges do not rely upon the “stability of boundaries” principle. On the other side, a special interpretative methodology is applied, which is based on a non-syllogistic legal reasoning. Whilst judicial syllogism prescribes a clear separation between interpretation of rules (the legal or major premise of the syllogism) and establishment of facts (the factual or minor premise of the syllogism), such a separation becomes illusory in the field of boundary treaties, because of the strict relationship existing between identification of geographical features and interpretation of texts and maps.
|Numero di pagine||60|
|Rivista||RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2015|