LEBENSWELT ALS PRAKTISCHER HORIZONT

Risultato della ricerca: Article

Abstract

The paper presents an assessment of the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt on the basis of the latemanuscripts on genetic analysis. The reflection on the concept of the life-world intends to evaluatethe contribution of phenomenology to the philosophical debate beyond the contention betweenrealism, naturalism, and subjectivism. The paper starts by evaluating the idea of the “universalcorrelation”, thereby stressing the egological figure of the “Ich-kann” (I-can) as the propercandidate to achieve the constitution of the life-world. The author claims that the constitutiveactivity of the I-can is based not only on intellectual and perceiving acts, but rather on acomprehensive praxis, which also bears ethical meaning. The sense-borrowing activity of the I-canis namely responsible for the inner articulation of the plural particular worlds (Sonderwelten)within the encompassing life-world. Such a relation between interest-centered worlds and theencompassing life-world is not merely empirical and cannot be explained in causal and factualterms. It rather points out a peculiar subjective responsibility intended as a specific access to theworld that bears a significant moral meaning. Here appears a pre-predicative and pre-normativeform of responsibility rooted in the temporal and intentional structure of experience, connectedwith the first forms of socialization and with the essential structure of the life-world as a world“for everybody”.
Lingua originaleGerman
pagine (da-a)46-65
Numero di pagine20
RivistaHORIZON. FENOMENOLOGICESKIE ISSLEDOVANIA
Volume6
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

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LEBENSWELT ALS PRAKTISCHER HORIZONT. / Pugliese, Alice.

In: HORIZON. FENOMENOLOGICESKIE ISSLEDOVANIA, Vol. 6, 2017, pag. 46-65.

Risultato della ricerca: Article

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