Law, Plans and Practical Rartionality

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Abstract

There is, according to many contemporary jurisprudential theories, a tight relationship between law and practical rationality: the law gives us, or at least it purports to give us, reasons for action. In his book, Legality (2011), Scott J. Shapiro puts forward what at first glance appears to be a new view in this vein. Shapiro calls it the “Planning Theory” of law; it provides an account of what the law is in terms of a particular kind of reasons: plans (a notion moulded, in his work in the philosophy of action, by Michael E. Bratman). In this paper, I provide a reconstruction of the Planning Theory as a view of the relationships between law and practical rationality, and I point to some fundamental issues which, when considered in this light, the theory leaves open, or which seem to raise trouble for it.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)211-254
Numero di pagine44
RivistaDIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE
Volumen. 12
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2012

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Planning
Practical Rationality
Glance
Reasons for Action
Theory of Law
Philosophy of Action
Fundamental

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Law, Plans and Practical Rartionality. / Celano, Bruno.

In: DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE, Vol. n. 12, 2012, pag. 211-254.

Risultato della ricerca: Article

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