Legal positivism’s conception of legal knowledge – which in Italy derives from the thought of Norberto Bobbio – sets up a tight bond between law and language. According to this perspective, law is the discourse of the legislator and legal science is nothing but a discourse on a discourse: a meta-language descriptive of the prescriptive language of the legislator. This conception of law and this model of legal science have been in crisis for some decades. Since the publication in 1950 of Bobbio’s essay Science of law and analysis of language, a true “programmatic manifesto” of the new course of legal philosophy, many things have changed: globalization has produced a crisis of the legal model centring on the sovereignty of national states; neo-Empiricism no longer represents the mainstream in the epistemological sphere, and also the contemporary legal philosophy debate has gone in directions diverging from those of the analytical school. In my paper I present four arguments serving to underline the limits of this approach to law: the functionalist argument, the epistemological argument, the argument of epistemological pluralism, and lastly the argument of the interpretative turn. These arguments are not all on the same plane and do not all have the same strength. Some only furnish an explanation of why analytical law orthodoxy on legal science is under attack. Others claim to identify some structural and conceptual limits of this model.
|Numero di pagine||8|
|Rivista||ANALISI E DIRITTO|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2014|