L’idealismo trascendente tra Cusano e Leibniz

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I aim at demonstrating how both Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz gleanfrom the platonic school of thought the idealistic notion of ‘truth as expression’,orienting it towards the singularity of being. I will also reveal a second assumptionderived from the philosophia perennis by both thinkers: the idea of philosophy ashypothetic and intersubjective undertaking. The theoretical results of thisphilosophical conceptualization are formulated in the name of the Possibility ratherthan in the name of Necessity. Under this shared perspective, Nicholas and Leibnizinterpret the substantial forms (formae substantiales) as “unities without plurality”.It follows that the dialectic subjects can only be two: the creating God – Monasmonadum for Leibniz – and the created substantial forms. In slightly differentways, Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz deny an autonomous ontological status to theWorld and its uniqueness. Nevertheless, the substantial forms need a unifyingstructure to become intelligible to the humans. Such frame can work as a topologicalconjunction that bears the intermonadical and anagogical paths, leading thespiritual monads back to their principle. The Cusanian and Leibnizian venationessapientiae are both embedded in a coherent paradigm of transcendent, monadic,and finalistic idealism.
Lingua originaleItalian
Titolo della pubblicazione ospiteCusano e Leibniz. Prospettive filosofiche
Numero di pagine15
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2013

Serie di pubblicazioni

NomeBiblioteca Cusana

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