In his Collective Intentions and Actions John Searle argued that having apreintentional sense of others as at least potentially cooperative agents “like me” is anecessary condition of collective intentionality. He also argued, in Rationality inAction, that understanding others qua intentional agents necessarily presupposesrationality because rational constraints are built into the logical structure ofintentional phenomena. In this paper we will try to specify further these claims in thelight of current debate on mindreading, where other-understanding is spelled outeither in terms of automatic, subpersonal simulative mechanisms, or in terms ofnormative, rational principles. We will argue for a mixed approach to understand theprereflective sense of the other as already involving normative, rational constraintson cooperative behavior.
|Numero di pagine||15|
|Rivista||RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA DEL LINGUAGGIO|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2014|