il concetto di danno nell'etica liberale e i suoi critici

Giorgio Maniaci

il concetto di danno nell'etica liberale e i suoi critici

Giurisprudenza

Risultato della ricerca: Article › peer review

Abstract

The Concept of Harm according to Liberal Ethics and Its Critics. In this article, I will look at the harm principle and the concept of harm, analysing their importance from a philosophical and legal point of view and addressing some objections that Arthur Ripstein and Ronald Dworkin advance against the harm principle.

Lingua originale	Italian
pagine (da-a)	346-364
Numero di pagine	19
Rivista	Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto
Volume	6
Stato di pubblicazione	Published - 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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