How do I rule my solver’s relationship? An empirical investigation of governance structures in crowdsourcing contests

Risultato della ricerca: Other

Abstract

In order to continually innovate, companies are increasingly opening their boundariesand signing crowdsourcing agreements with solution providers. However,crowdsourcing scholars are no closer to understanding how possible solvers’opportunistic behaviours affect the governance structure proposed by the seeker at themoment the challenge is broadcast. Building on the managerial-choice approach oftransaction cost economics, we aim to examine how contract conditions, specified inthe request for proposal (RFP), aiming to reduce the effect of solver’s opportunisticbehaviours whilst influencing seekers’ preferences toward proposing contractualagreements to manage the working relationship with the winning solver. Analysingdetailed data gathered from 582 RFPs broadcasted in the NineSigma innovationcrowdsourcing platform, we show that specific RFP contract conditions reducing theadverse selection and the moral hazard problem have a positive impact on the seekers’preference toward proposing contractual agreements. Moreover, we find that thepresence of the fairness social-context concept influences the relationship between theRFP contract conditions and the seeker’s propensity in proposing a contractualagreement. In fact, designing challenges with a strong fairness mechanism, in order toincentivize solvers’ participation and maximize the performance of the challenge andprotect seekers from solvers’ opportunistic. Our study offers interesting contributionsboth to transaction cost economics and to the crowdsourcing for innovation literature.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Numero di pagine0
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2016

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Governance structure
Empirical investigation
Contests
Fairness
Moral hazard
Economic cost
Participation
Propensity
Transaction cost economics
Innovation
Social context

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title = "How do I rule my solver’s relationship? An empirical investigation of governance structures in crowdsourcing contests",
abstract = "In order to continually innovate, companies are increasingly opening their boundariesand signing crowdsourcing agreements with solution providers. However,crowdsourcing scholars are no closer to understanding how possible solvers’opportunistic behaviours affect the governance structure proposed by the seeker at themoment the challenge is broadcast. Building on the managerial-choice approach oftransaction cost economics, we aim to examine how contract conditions, specified inthe request for proposal (RFP), aiming to reduce the effect of solver’s opportunisticbehaviours whilst influencing seekers’ preferences toward proposing contractualagreements to manage the working relationship with the winning solver. Analysingdetailed data gathered from 582 RFPs broadcasted in the NineSigma innovationcrowdsourcing platform, we show that specific RFP contract conditions reducing theadverse selection and the moral hazard problem have a positive impact on the seekers’preference toward proposing contractual agreements. Moreover, we find that thepresence of the fairness social-context concept influences the relationship between theRFP contract conditions and the seeker’s propensity in proposing a contractualagreement. In fact, designing challenges with a strong fairness mechanism, in order toincentivize solvers’ participation and maximize the performance of the challenge andprotect seekers from solvers’ opportunistic. Our study offers interesting contributionsboth to transaction cost economics and to the crowdsourcing for innovation literature.",
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T1 - How do I rule my solver’s relationship? An empirical investigation of governance structures in crowdsourcing contests

AU - Piazza, Mariangela

AU - Perrone, Giovanni

AU - Mazzola, Erica

PY - 2016

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N2 - In order to continually innovate, companies are increasingly opening their boundariesand signing crowdsourcing agreements with solution providers. However,crowdsourcing scholars are no closer to understanding how possible solvers’opportunistic behaviours affect the governance structure proposed by the seeker at themoment the challenge is broadcast. Building on the managerial-choice approach oftransaction cost economics, we aim to examine how contract conditions, specified inthe request for proposal (RFP), aiming to reduce the effect of solver’s opportunisticbehaviours whilst influencing seekers’ preferences toward proposing contractualagreements to manage the working relationship with the winning solver. Analysingdetailed data gathered from 582 RFPs broadcasted in the NineSigma innovationcrowdsourcing platform, we show that specific RFP contract conditions reducing theadverse selection and the moral hazard problem have a positive impact on the seekers’preference toward proposing contractual agreements. Moreover, we find that thepresence of the fairness social-context concept influences the relationship between theRFP contract conditions and the seeker’s propensity in proposing a contractualagreement. In fact, designing challenges with a strong fairness mechanism, in order toincentivize solvers’ participation and maximize the performance of the challenge andprotect seekers from solvers’ opportunistic. Our study offers interesting contributionsboth to transaction cost economics and to the crowdsourcing for innovation literature.

AB - In order to continually innovate, companies are increasingly opening their boundariesand signing crowdsourcing agreements with solution providers. However,crowdsourcing scholars are no closer to understanding how possible solvers’opportunistic behaviours affect the governance structure proposed by the seeker at themoment the challenge is broadcast. Building on the managerial-choice approach oftransaction cost economics, we aim to examine how contract conditions, specified inthe request for proposal (RFP), aiming to reduce the effect of solver’s opportunisticbehaviours whilst influencing seekers’ preferences toward proposing contractualagreements to manage the working relationship with the winning solver. Analysingdetailed data gathered from 582 RFPs broadcasted in the NineSigma innovationcrowdsourcing platform, we show that specific RFP contract conditions reducing theadverse selection and the moral hazard problem have a positive impact on the seekers’preference toward proposing contractual agreements. Moreover, we find that thepresence of the fairness social-context concept influences the relationship between theRFP contract conditions and the seeker’s propensity in proposing a contractualagreement. In fact, designing challenges with a strong fairness mechanism, in order toincentivize solvers’ participation and maximize the performance of the challenge andprotect seekers from solvers’ opportunistic. Our study offers interesting contributionsboth to transaction cost economics and to the crowdsourcing for innovation literature.

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