In this paper I draw the outline of a psychological genealogy of normativity: an account of normativityas a complex neuro-psychological fact, entirely analysable in non-normative terms. As a first step, Iintroduce two of the main problems faced by the genealogical approach. I call the first one “Gibbardproblem”: what kind of neuro-psychological state is normative judgment? I call the second one“irreducibility of normativity problem”: normative dynamics seem to be irreducible to causal dynamics.As a second step, I examine the “dual model” of the psychology of normative judgment developed by J.Haidt and J. Greene. I argue that the dual model is not able to solve the aforementioned problems.However, it points at the right direction. Moving from the conceptual framework and the difficultiesoutlined in the discussion of the dual model, I eventually propose an alternative model, the “model ofcontrol”. According to this model, normative guidance consists of a network of recursive controlprocesses. Normative judgment is the conscious mental state we access when the relevant controlprocess is completed. Reasons and norms are parameters that causally guide the process.
|Numero di pagine||45|
|Rivista||DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2018|
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