Free Action and Interventionist Theory of Causality

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Abstract

I shall discuss the relationship between the interventionist theory of causation and freeaction. Interventionist accounts of causation define causation on the basis of “intervention”. Thesetheories can be reductive, if they explain causes on the basis of human free interventions, or nonreductive, if they consider causes and interventions as two inter-defined concepts, where interventionsare regarded as explicitly not human. I will show that the dilemma between reductive and nonreductive interventionist theories of causality can be overcome in favour of reductive accounts, withregard to what causation is in anthropological sense, and with regard to the causal explanation ofphenomena. Non-reductive accounts, explaining causes based on interventions and defininginterventions as special causes (without any reference to human actions) create a dangerousexplanatory circularity between cause and intervention and are not able to give a general andexplanatory idea of causation. Reductive interventionist theories, instead, do not suffer from thiscircularity
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)282-294
Numero di pagine13
RivistaRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Volume10
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • Social Psychology
  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

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