In this article, I analyse the evolution of Foucault’s conception of subject, subjection, and freedom. Inthe mid-70s, starting from the idea that subjects (self-conscious and rational individuals) are shapedand constituted by a web of social influences – a sort of impersonal power –, Foucault seemed toconclude against the possibility of subjects being, in some relevant sense, “free”. Subjectivity, far frombeing the condition for freedom, is the vehicle of a deep and inescapable subjection. In his last years,although he maintained the thesis of the subject as product of social influences, he repeatedly insisted onthe compatibility of this thesis with the possibility of a peculiar form of freedom, that I call “freedom-asauthoriality”.Foucault did not develop the notion of freedom-as-authoriality in a systematic way. He onlyprovided scattered and vague hints. In making explicit the rich and articulated conception which underliesthem, I highlight the contradictions to which it seems to be exposed, and I argue that they can be overcomeif Foucault’s notions are framed in the picture of the causal structure of individual control and creativity,and of cultural transmission and evolution, suggested by the contemporary sciences of the mind-brain.
|Numero di pagine||28|
|Rivista||DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2019|
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