This work aims to analyze the characteristics of fiscal competition within the framework of both real and financial globalization and its implications in the relationships between states and corporations. It is also the first step in a larger study examining the positive and negative effects of tax competition and bank secrecy competition. In effect, outcomes in fiscal competition are produced by the sum of two different, but related, kinds of competition: tax competition and bank secrecy competition. In terms of the manifestation of tax competition, our analysis points to the phenomenon in which sovereign countries aim to attract both portfolio investments as well as direct investment by lowering their effective tax rate. As for the expression of bank secrecy competition, this paper underlines how legislative provisions allow for a strong bank secrecy regime and effective non-cooperation with foreign fiscal authorities. This, in turn, affects the outcome of fiscal competition in a way that allows " financial havens " to be the winners, by definition, of fiscal competition. Finally, it should be noted that the legislative functions of states are influenced by economic power and, in this scenario, our analysis shows the manner in which the principles of democracy and equality are changing in order to promote economic efficiency.
|Numero di pagine||34|
|Rivista||DIRITTO E PRATICA TRIBUTARIA INTERNAZIONALE|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2016|