Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms

Tesoriere A

Risultato della ricerca: Article

9 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

A model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. At each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of leaders is given, production at subsequent periods is always prevented, and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1381-1388
Numero di pagine8
RivistaInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume2008
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2008

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Industry
Costs
Endogenous timing
Cournot equilibrium
Encompassing
Multiple equilibria
Cournot
Free entry
Stackelberg
Marginal cost
Dominant firm

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial relations

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Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms. / Tesoriere A.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 2008, 2008, pag. 1381-1388.

Risultato della ricerca: Article

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AB - A model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. At each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of leaders is given, production at subsequent periods is always prevented, and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level.

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