Endogenous R&D Symmetry in linear duopoly with one-way spillovers

Risultato della ricerca: Articlepeer review

12 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

A duopoly model of cost reducing R&D-Cournot market competition is extended to encompass endogenous timing of R&D investments. Under the assumption that R&D spillovers are zero under simultaneous choices of R&D and only flow from the R&D leader to the follower under sequential choices, sequential and simultaneous play at the R&D stage are compared in order to assess the role of technological externalities in stimulating or attenuating endogenous firm asymmetry. The only timing structure of the R&D stage sustainable as subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium involves simultaneous play and thus zero spillovers.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)213-225
Numero di pagine13
RivistaJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
Volume66
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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