In a standard model of R&D followed by linear Cournot competition, firm asymmetryis sustainable as equilibrium with non cooperative R&D if and only if theproductivity of research is sufficiently large relative to the benefits of imitation. Increasingspillovers distribute R&D results among asymmetric competitors, causingprice, firm asymmetry, and joint profit to reduce. With zero spillovers, a symmetricjoint lab dominates asymmetric R&D competition in terms of social welfare and consumersurplus, but is sometimes dominated in terms of joint profit. Raising spilloversencourage symmetric collusion but makes the latter potentially harmful to consumers.(JEL : C72; L13; O32).
|Numero di pagine||19|
|Rivista||Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2009|
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