Elezioni europee e soglia di sbarramento. Il contributo della Corte costituzionale tra diritto dell'Unione e diritto interno

Risultato della ricerca: Article

Abstract

The article focuses on a fundamental decision of Italian Constitutional Court, regarding the threshold of 4% for the election of italian members of European Parliament. The Court concludes it is not unconstitutional because of the central role that a threshold plays to reduce the political fragmentation within the Assembly.
Lingua originaleItalian
Numero di pagine5
RivistaQuaderni Costituzionali
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2019

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title = "Elezioni europee e soglia di sbarramento. Il contributo della Corte costituzionale tra diritto dell'Unione e diritto interno",
abstract = "The article focuses on a fundamental decision of Italian Constitutional Court, regarding the threshold of 4{\%} for the election of italian members of European Parliament. The Court concludes it is not unconstitutional because of the central role that a threshold plays to reduce the political fragmentation within the Assembly.",
author = "Marco Armanno",
year = "2019",
language = "Italian",
journal = "Quaderni Costituzionali",
issn = "0392-6664",
publisher = "Il Mulino publishing house",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Elezioni europee e soglia di sbarramento. Il contributo della Corte costituzionale tra diritto dell'Unione e diritto interno

AU - Armanno, Marco

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The article focuses on a fundamental decision of Italian Constitutional Court, regarding the threshold of 4% for the election of italian members of European Parliament. The Court concludes it is not unconstitutional because of the central role that a threshold plays to reduce the political fragmentation within the Assembly.

AB - The article focuses on a fundamental decision of Italian Constitutional Court, regarding the threshold of 4% for the election of italian members of European Parliament. The Court concludes it is not unconstitutional because of the central role that a threshold plays to reduce the political fragmentation within the Assembly.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/358339

M3 - Article

JO - Quaderni Costituzionali

JF - Quaderni Costituzionali

SN - 0392-6664

ER -