Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models

Salvatore Modica; David K. Levine

Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models

Risultato della ricerca: Article › peer review

Abstract

We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.

Lingua originale	English
pagine (da-a)	89-131
Numero di pagine	43
Rivista	THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
Volume	11
Stato di pubblicazione	Published - 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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