Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors

Dario Bauso, Angelia Nedić

Risultato della ricerca: Article

18 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs. The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the average game.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)-
Numero di pagine13
RivistaIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Volume6
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Communication

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications

Cita questo

@article{452dbb022f5e4a7791730dfe01047dfc,
title = "Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors",
abstract = "We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs. The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the average game.",
keywords = "Game theory; optimization",
author = "Dario Bauso and Angelia Nedić",
year = "2013",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "--",
journal = "IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control",
issn = "0018-9286",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors

AU - Bauso, Dario

AU - Nedić, Angelia

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs. The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the average game.

AB - We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs. The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the average game.

KW - Game theory; optimization

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/89763

UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6395804&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F9%2F6517505%2F06395804.pdf%3Farnumber%3D6395804

M3 - Article

VL - 6

SP - -

JO - IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

JF - IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

SN - 0018-9286

ER -