Distributed Consensus in Noncooperative Inventory Games.

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10 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players’ strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players. Such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player’s data exposure to the competitors.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)866-878
Numero di pagine13
RivistaEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume192
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2009

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Nash Equilibrium
Game
Congestion Games
Costs
Information Structure
Probable
Sharing
Sufficient
Minimise
Beliefs
Nash equilibrium
Strategy
Context
Competitors
Congestion games
Information structure
Best response
Social optimum

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems and Management
  • Transportation
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cita questo

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title = "Distributed Consensus in Noncooperative Inventory Games.",
abstract = "This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players’ strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players. Such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player’s data exposure to the competitors.",
author = "Laura Giarre and Raffaele Pesenti and Dario Bauso and Raffaele Pesenti",
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T1 - Distributed Consensus in Noncooperative Inventory Games.

AU - Giarre, Laura

AU - Pesenti, Raffaele

AU - Bauso, Dario

AU - Pesenti, Raffaele

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players’ strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players. Such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player’s data exposure to the competitors.

AB - This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players’ strategies to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players. Such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player’s data exposure to the competitors.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/39008

M3 - Article

VL - 192

SP - 866

EP - 878

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

SN - 0377-2217

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