Abstract
This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospectiveCournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize jointprofit. It studies how R&Dactivity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfarevary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium withsecond bestR&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results showthat the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adoptedand on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.
| Lingua originale | English |
|---|---|
| Numero di pagine | 28 |
| Rivista | JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS |
| Volume | 2014 |
| Stato di pubblicazione | Published - 2014 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
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- ???subjectarea.asjc.2000.2002???