Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers

Risultato della ricerca: Article

3 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospective Cournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize joint profit. It studies how R&Dactivity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare vary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium with second bestR&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results show that the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adopted and on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)-
Numero di pagine28
RivistaJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Volume2014
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2014

Fingerprint

Joint ventures
Cournot oligopoly
Cartels
Spillover
Cartel
Synergy
Profit
Consumer surplus
Policy implications
Competitors

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cita questo

@article{e901ab701ac9491282b8c5f3bce41103,
title = "Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers",
abstract = "This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospective Cournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize joint profit. It studies how R&Dactivity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare vary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium with second bestR&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results show that the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adopted and on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.",
author = "Antonio Tesoriere",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
volume = "2014",
pages = "--",
journal = "Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie",
issn = "0931-8658",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag Wien",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers

AU - Tesoriere, Antonio

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospective Cournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize joint profit. It studies how R&Dactivity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare vary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium with second bestR&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results show that the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adopted and on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.

AB - This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospective Cournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize joint profit. It studies how R&Dactivity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare vary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium with second bestR&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results show that the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adopted and on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/97407

M3 - Article

VL - 2014

SP - -

JO - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

JF - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

SN - 0931-8658

ER -