The opening remarks of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus seem to outline the bases of an atomistic ontological theory. For the resolute interpreters, such an ontology should be considered as mere part of the set of nonsensical propositions that make up the parody of a semantic theory. However, resolute readers share with the traditional views an essentialist reading of the ontological section, according to which Wittgenstein's remarks are intended to build up a real, though parodistic, atomistic ontology. By contrast, textual evidence supports the idea that the basic notion of Wittgenstein’s ontology, i.e. the notion of object, should be considered as an intra-linguistic, rather than an ontological one. In this paper, we want to show how some of the main claims of the resolute readings could be fruitfully combined with the analyses of Tractarian objects that illustrate them as the semantic roles of names.
|Numero di pagine||5|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2014|