The essay is aimed at briefly describing the ways in which the relationship between English law and Scottish law has been regulated over the centuries since the Act of Union, 1707 saw the light. In particular, an historical outline of the often re-adfirmed autonomy of Scottish law is here given, with regard to its firm upholding by Scottish Courts in famous cases. The inquiry that is at the heart of the present analysis touches upon the consequences that the passing of the Scotland Act 1998 by the Parliament of Westminster may have had on such autonomy. So, the question is whether or not this law has acted in a way to reinforce, rather than weaken, the idea that Scottish private law continues to be the fundamental body of principles and rules that governs what amounts to an interindividual relationship. An in-depth exploration, conducted in accordance with the main output of the thought of Dicey, of both the few judicial decisions and the wider doctrinal contributions that have developed since the Scotland Act was approved at the end of last millennium leads to the reasoned conclusion that the autonomy has been left intact and this Statute has even propelled the notion that Scottish private law, and its underlying principles, is the prime legal source as regards the field of all relationships falling into Gaius’ traditional partition.
|Numero di pagine||35|
|Rivista||EUROPA E DIRITTO PRIVATO|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2012|