Legal positivism’s conception of legal knowledge sets up a tight bond between law and language. According to this perspective, law is the discourse of the legislator and legal science is nothing but a discourse on a discourse: a meta-language descriptive of the prescriptive language of the legislator. This conception of law and this model of legal science have been in crisis for some decades. In my paper I present four arguments serving to underline the limits of this approach to law: the epistemological argument, the argument of epistemological pluralism, the argument of the interpretative turn, and lastly the functionalist argument. These arguments are not all on the same plane and do not all have the same strength. Some only furnish an explanation of why analytical law orthodoxy on legal science is under attack. Others claim to identify some structural and conceptual limits of this model.
|Numero di pagine||25|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2014|