This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. Itfocuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location patternand public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between thedesigner and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem,at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of thelower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that privatecompanies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore,transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fullyeconomies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.
|Numero di pagine||11|
|Rivista||Journal of Transport Geography|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Published - 2014|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Geography, Planning and Development