A Stackelberg-game approach to support the design of logistic terminals

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Abstract

This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore, transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fully economies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)---
Numero di pagine11
RivistaJournal of Transport Geography
Volume41
Stato di pubblicazionePublished - 2014

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Consolidation
consolidation
Logistics
logistics
Travel time
travel time
road
Italy
travel
public
services
society

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Environmental Science(all)
  • Transportation

Cita questo

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title = "A Stackelberg-game approach to support the design of logistic terminals",
abstract = "This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore, transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fully economies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.",
keywords = "Logistic terminal design, Load factor optimisation, Public share in investment, Bilevel noncooperative game, Discrete location model",
author = "Marco Migliore and Mario Catalano",
year = "2014",
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journal = "Journal of Transport Geography",
issn = "0966-6923",
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AU - Migliore, Marco

AU - Catalano, Mario

PY - 2014

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N2 - This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore, transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fully economies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.

AB - This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore, transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fully economies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.

KW - Logistic terminal design, Load factor optimisation, Public share in investment, Bilevel noncooperative game, Discrete location model

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10447/100950

M3 - Article

VL - 41

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JO - Journal of Transport Geography

JF - Journal of Transport Geography

SN - 0966-6923

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