A Stackelberg-game approach to support the design of logistic terminals

This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. Itfocuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location patternand public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between thedesigner and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem,at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of thelower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that privatecompanies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore,transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fullyeconomies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.