Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders always displaces the followers. Instead, how a stronger threat of entry affects the equilibrium depends on the technology. With strictly convex costs it is the followers that eventually displace the leaders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)102-117
Number of pages16
JournalResearch in Economics
Publication statusPublished - 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this