Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis

Masserini, L; Pratesi, M

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In this paper we perform a statistical evaluation of whether it is worthwhile, in economic terms, to resist to extortion demands by the ma a, from the point of view of rms operating in an area dominated by criminal organizations. We use a unique collected and matched database on rm characteristics on the city of Palermo, highly controlled by the ma a racket. The underlined idea is that the claimed resistance has (direct and indirect) costs and bene ts, so that a rational rm should take this decision according its economic expectations on the future pro ts (in addition to potential ethic considerations). It means that the economic policy messages of this experience can be linked to make more pro table the racket resistance (as a signal sent to the market). Our evidences based on multilevel discrete choice models show that this decision is strongly in uenced by socio-economic characteristics of the district, type of activity involved and other factors.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLLEE Working Paper Series
Number of pages35
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Publication series

NameLLEE Working Paper Series, N. 115


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