LINGUAGGIO, INTENZIONI E RAZIONALITA’ PRATICA: UN’IPOTESI INTERPRETATIVA DELLE BASI DEL GIUDIZIO MORALE.

Marta Clemente

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

[automatically translated] The path shown in the following pages originates at the intersection of philosophical thought of GEM Anscombe (1919-2001) with some of the recent Anglo-American studies in the field of practical reasoning. Anscombe's work, for more than an original and inspiring, has a unique conceptual fertility relative to the vexed question of the logical status, epistemological, and ethical action, with particular reference to the action intentional characters. As a result, the contributions of Philippa Foot and Martha Nussbaum to the definition of an action's theory contemporary, have developed and enriched the very concepts of 'action' and 'practical rationality', highlighting the most problematic aspects, focusable as follows : 1. the relationship between the action and the factors that would determine the 'trend' (feelings, passions, desires, attitudes, intentions); 2. the relationship between the practical rationality and moral acts; 3. the relationship between the moral language and action, as a moral judgment first says something on the action of each individual covered, talking about what a reason (of a certain kind, 'moral') to be made . In the writings of Foot and Nussbaum, representatives - in an otherwise of an Aristotelian naturalism, which opposes them to most of the non-cognitivist ethical argument, the points just mentioned constitute crucial questions: place fact that a theory it is not thereby a virtuous action theory, the role (cognitive,
Original languageItalian
Title of host publicationLinguaggio ed emozioni
Number of pages598
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameBollettino Filosofico

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