Il Rule of law secondo Ronald Dworkin. Qualche osservazione critica

[automatically translated] The goal of this essay is to critically analyze the famous distinction proposed by Ronald Dworkin in three models of community, which he calls community de facto, the "rule book" and the principle; The last two models we can consider them as two versions of general models of RoL I briefly introduced in this section. While preference Dworkin goes indisputably to the community of principle, I propose to advance some arguments in defense of the community of the "rule book". More precisely, the goal is to show some flaws in dworkiniana reconstruction of the community of principle. In short, and anticipating the conclusions, my objection to Dworkin is as follows: He feels that in a principled political community is possible to avoid negotiations and compromises between their personal preferences, relevancy, among community members. This belief, however, is false, and the only difference between this community and the community of the rules book is that, in the latter case, the compromises and negotiations are presented for what they are, while in the first case are disguised as genuine disagreements the correct understanding of the values of the community of which it is assumed there is a generalized and "agreement often" (thick).