Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers

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5 Citations (Scopus)


This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospectiveCournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize jointprofit. It studies how R&Dactivity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfarevary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium withsecond bestR&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results showthat the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adoptedand on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages28
Publication statusPublished - 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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